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Abstract: Medical research has evolved conventions for choosing 
sample size in randomized clinical trials that rest on the theory of 
hypothesis testing.  Bayesians have argued that trials should be 
designed to maximize subjective expected utility in settings of clinical 
interest. This perspective is compelling given a credible prior 
distribution on treatment response, but there is rarely consensus on 
what the subjective prior beliefs should be.  We use Wald’s frequentist 
statistical decision theory to study design of trials under ambiguity.  
We show that ε-optimal rules exist when trials have large enough 
sample size. An ε-optimal rule has expected welfare within ε of the 
welfare of the best treatment in every state of nature.  Equivalently, it 
has maximum regret no larger than ε.  We consider trials that draw 
predetermined numbers of subjects at random within groups stratified 
by covariates and treatments.  We report exact results for the special 
case of two treatments and binary outcomes.  We give simple sufficient 
conditions on sample sizes that ensure existence of ε-optimal treatment 
rules when there are multiple treatments and outcomes are bounded.  
These conditions are obtained by application of Hoeffding large 
deviations inequalities to evaluate the performance of empirical 
success rules. 
 
Significance Statement: A core objective of trials comparing 
alternative medical treatments is to inform treatment choice in clinical 
practice.  Yet conventional practice in designing trials has been to 
choose a sample size that yields specified statistical power.  Power, a 
concept in the theory of hypothesis testing, is at most loosely 
connected to effective treatment choice.  This paper develops an 
alternative principle for trial design that aims to directly benefit 
medical decision making.  We propose choosing a sample size that 
enables implementation of near-optimal treatment rules.  Near 
optimality means that treatment choices are suitably close to the best 
that could be achieved if clinicians were to know with certainty mean 
treatment response in their patient populations.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A core objective of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) comparing 
alternative medical treatments is to inform treatment choice in clinical 
practice.  Yet the conventional practice in designing trials has been to 
choose a sample size that yields specified statistical power.  Power, a 
concept in the statistical theory of hypothesis testing, is at most loosely 
connected to effective treatment choice. 
This paper develops an alternative principle for trial design that 
aims to directly benefit medical decision making.  We propose 
choosing a sample size that enables implementation of near-optimal 
treatment rules.  Near optimality means that treatment choices are 
suitably close to the best that could be achieved if clinicians were to 
know with certainty mean treatment response in their patient 
populations.  We report exact results for the case of two treatments and 
binary outcomes.  We derive simple formulae to compute sufficient 
sample sizes in clinical trials with multiple treatments.   
While our immediate concern is to improve the design of RCTs, 
our work contributes more broadly by adding to the reasons why 
scientists and the general public should question the hegemony of 
hypothesis testing as a methodology used to collect and analyze sample 
data.  It has become common for scientists to express concern that 
evaluation of empirical research by the outcome of statistical 
hypothesis tests generates publication bias and diminishes the 
reproducibility of findings.  See, for example, (1) and the recent 
statement by the American Statistical Association (2).  We call 
attention to a further deficiency of testing.  In addition to providing an 
unsatisfactory basis for evaluation of research that uses sample data, 
testing also is deficient as a basis for the design of data collection. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. The Conventional Practice 
 
The conventional use of statistical power calculations to set sample 
size in RCTs derives from the presumption that data on outcomes in a 
classical trial with perfect validity will be used to test a specified null 
hypothesis against an alternative.  A common practice is to use the 
outcome of a hypothesis test to recommend whether a patient 
population should receive a status quo treatment or an innovation.  The 
usual null hypothesis is that the innovation is no better than the status 
quo and the alternative is that the innovation is better.  If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, it is recommended that the status quo 
treatment continue to be used.  If the null is rejected, it is recommended 
that the innovation replace the status quo as the treatment of choice. 
The standard practice has been to perform a test that fixes the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is correct, called 
the probability of a Type I error.  Then sample size determines the 
probability of rejecting the alternative hypothesis when it is correct, 
called the probability of a Type II error.  The power of a test is defined 
as one minus the probability of a type II error.  The convention has 
been to choose a sample size that yields specified power at some value 
of the effect size deemed clinically important. 
The U. S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses such a test 
to approve new treatments.  A pharmaceutical firm wanting approval 
of a new drug (the innovation) performs RCTs that compare the new 
drug with an approved drug or placebo (the status quo).  An FDA 
document providing guidance for the design of RCTs evaluating new 
medical devices states that the probability of a Type I error is 
conventionally set to 0.05 and that the probability of a Type II error 
depends on the claim for the device but should not exceed 0.20 (3).  
The International Conference on Harmonisation (4) has provided 
similar guidance for the design of RCTs evaluating pharmaceuticals, 
stating (p. 1923): “Conventionally the probability of type I error is set 
at 5% or less or as dictated by any adjustments made necessary for 
multiplicity considerations; the precise choice may be influenced by 
the prior plausibility of the hypothesis under test and the desired 
impact of the results. The probability of type II error is conventionally 
set at 10% to 20%.” 
Trials with samples too small to achieve conventional error 
probabilities are called "underpowered" and are regularly criticized as 
scientifically useless and medically unethical.  For example, Halpern, 
Karlawish, and Berlin (5) write (p. 358): “Because such studies may 
not adequately test the underlying hypotheses, they have been 
considered ‘scientifically useless’ and therefore unethical in their 
exposure of participants to the risks and burdens of human research.”  
Ones with samples larger than needed to achieve conventional error 
probabilities are called "overpowered" and are sometimes criticized as 
unethical.  For example, Altman (6) writes (p. 1336): “A study with an 
overlarge sample may be deemed unethical through the unnecessary 
involvement of extra subjects and the correspondingly increased 
costs.” 
 
2.2. Deficiencies of Using Statistical Power to Choose Sample Size 
 
There are multiple reasons why choosing sample size to achieve 
specified statistical power may yield unsatisfactory results for medical 
decisions.  These include 
 
(1) Use of conventional asymmetric error probabilities: As 
discussed above, it has been standard to fix the probability of Type I 
error at 5% and the probability of Type II error for a clinically 
important alternative at 10-20%, which implies that the probability of 
Type II error reaches 95% for alternatives close to the null.  The theory 
of hypothesis testing gives no rationale for selection of these 
conventional error probabilities.  In particular, it gives no reason why 
a clinician concerned with patient welfare should find it reasonable to 
make treatment choices that have a substantially greater probability of 
Type II than Type I error. 
 
(2) Inattention to magnitudes of losses when errors occur: A 
clinician should care about more than the probabilities of Type I and 
II error.  He should care as well about the magnitudes of the losses to 
patient welfare that arise when errors occur.  A given error probability 
should be less acceptable when the welfare difference between 
treatments is larger, but the theory of hypothesis testing does not take 
this into account. 
 
(3) Limitation to settings with two treatments: A clinician often 
chooses among several treatments and many clinical trials compare 
more than two treatments.  Yet the standard theory of hypothesis 
testing only contemplates choice between two treatments.  Statisticians 
have struggled to extend it to deal sensibly with comparisons of 
multiple treatments (7, 8). 
 
2.3. Bayesian Trial Design and Treatment Choice 
 
With these deficiencies in mind, Bayesian statisticians have long 
criticized the use of hypothesis testing to design trials and make 
treatment decisions.  The literature on Bayesian statistical inference 
rejects the frequentist foundations of hypothesis testing, arguing for 
superiority of the Bayesian practice of using sample data to transform 
a subjective prior distribution on treatment response into a subjective 
posterior distribution.  See, for example, (9, 10). 
 The literature on Bayesian statistical decision theory additionally 
argues that the purpose of trials is to improve medical decision making 
and concludes that trials should be designed to maximize subjective 
expected utility in decision problems of clinical interest.  The 
usefulness of performing a trial is expressed by the expected value of 
information (11), defined succinctly in Meltzer (12, p. 119) as “the 
change in expected utility with the collection of information.” The 
Bayesian value of information provided by a trial crucially depends on 
the subjective prior distribution.  The sample sizes selected in Bayesian 
trials may differ from those motivated by testing theory.  See, for 
example, (13, 14). 
 The Bayesian perspective is compelling when a decision maker 
feels able to place a credible subjective prior distribution on treatment 
response.  However, Bayesian statisticians have long struggled to 
provide guidance on specification of priors and the matter continues to 
be controversial.  See, for example, the spectrum of views expressed 
by the authors and discussants of (9).  The controversy suggests that 
inability to express a credible prior is common in actual decision 
settings. 
 
2.4. Uniformly Satisfactory Trial Design and Treatment Choice with 
the Minimax-Regret Criterion 
 
 When it is difficult to place a credible subjective distribution on 
treatment response, a reasonable way to make treatment choices is to 
use a decision rule that achieves uniformly satisfactory results, 
whatever the true distribution of treatment response may be.  There are 
multiple ways to formalize the idea of uniformly satisfactory results.  
One prominent idea motivates the minimax-regret (MMR) criterion. 
Minimax regret was first suggested as a general principle for 
decision making under uncertainty by Savage (15) within an essay 
commenting on the seminal Wald (16) development of statistical 
decision theory.  Wald considered the broad problem of using sample 
data to make decisions when one has incomplete knowledge of the 
choice environment, called the state of nature.  He recommended 
evaluation of decision rules as procedures, specifying how a decision 
maker would use whatever data may be realized.  In particular, he 
proposed measurement of the mean performance of decision rules 
across repetitions of the sampling process.  This grounds the Wald 
theory in frequentist rather than Bayesian statistical thinking.  See (17, 
18) for comprehensive expositions. 
Considering the Wald framework, Savage defined the regret 
associated with choice of a decision rule in a particular state of nature 
to be the mean loss in welfare that would occur across repeated 
samples if one were to choose this rule rather than the one that is best 
in this state of nature.  The actual decision problem requires choice of 
a decision rule without knowing the true state of nature.  The decision 
maker can evaluate a rule by the maximum regret that it may yield 
across all possible states of nature.  He can then choose a rule that 
minimizes the value of maximum regret.  Doing so yields a rule that is 
uniformly satisfactory in the sense of yielding the best possible upper 
bound on regret, whatever the true state of nature may be. 
It is important to understand that maximum regret as defined by 
Savage is computed ex ante, before one chooses an action.  It should 
not be confused with the familiar psychological notion of regret, which 
a person may perceive ex post after choosing an action and observing 
the true state of nature. 
A decision made by the MMR criterion is invariant with respect to 
increasing affine transformations of welfare, but it may vary when 
welfare is transformed nonlinearly.  The MMR criterion shares this 
property with expected utility maximization. 
 The MMR criterion is sometimes confused with the maximin 
criterion.  A decision maker using the maximin criterion chooses an 
action that maximizes the minimum welfare that might possibly occur.  
Someone using the MMR criterion chooses an action that minimizes 
the maximum loss to welfare that can possibly result from not knowing 
the welfare function. Whereas the maximin criterion considers only the 
worst outcome that an action may yield, MMR considers the worst 
outcome relative to what is achievable in a given state of nature. 
Savage (15), while introducing the MMR criterion, distinguished it 
sharply from maximin, writing that the latter criterion is 
“ultrapessimistic” while the former is not. 
Since the early 2000s, various authors have used the MMR 
criterion to study how a decision maker might use RCT data to 
subsequently choose treatments for the members of a population (19-
27). In these studies, the decision maker's objective has been expressed 
as maximization of a welfare function that sums treatment outcomes 
across the population.  For example, the objective may be to maximize 
the five-year survival rate of a population of cancer patients or the 
average number of quality-adjusted life years of a population with a 
chronic disease. 
The MMR criterion is applicable in general settings with multiple 
treatments.  Regret is easiest to explain when there are two treatments, 
say A and B.  If treatment A is better, regret is the probability of a Type 
I error (choosing B) times the magnitude of the resulting loss in 
population welfare due to assigning the inferior treatment.  
Symmetrically, if treatment B is better, regret is the probability of a 
Type II error (choosing A) times the magnitude of the resulting loss in 
population welfare due to foregoing the superior treatment.  In contrast 
to the use of hypothesis testing to choose a treatment, the MMR 
criterion views Type I and II error probabilities symmetrically and it 
assesses the magnitudes of the losses that errors produce. 
Whereas the work cited above has used the MMR criterion to guide 
treatment choice after a trial has been performed, the present paper 
uses it to guide the design of RCTs.  We focus on classical trials 
possessing perfect validity that compare alternative treatments relevant 
to clinical practice.  Treatments may include placebo if it is a relevant 
clinical option or if it is considered equivalent to prescribing no 
treatment (28, 29).  In particular, we study trials that draw subjects at 
random within groups of predetermined size stratified by covariates 
and treatments.  Section 3 summarizes the major findings.  The online 
Supporting Information section provides underlying technical 
analysis. 
 
 
3. Trials Enabling Near-Optimal Treatment Rules 
 
3.1. General Ideas 
 
An ideal objective for trial design would be to collect data that enable 
subsequent implementation of an optimal treatment rule in a 
population of interest−−one that always selects the best treatment, with 
no chance of error.  Optimality is too strong a property to be achievable 
with trials having finite sample size, but near-optimal rules exist when 
classical trials with perfect validity have large enough size. 
Given a specified ε > 0, an ε-optimal rule is one whose mean 
performance across samples is within ε of the welfare of the best 
treatment, whatever the true state of nature may be.  Equivalently, an 
ε-optimal rule has maximum regret no larger than ε.  Thus, an ε-optimal 
rule exists if and only if the MMR rule has maximum regret no larger 
than ε.   
Choosing sample size to enable existence of ε-optimal treatment 
rules provides an appealing criterion for design of trials that aim to 
inform treatment choice.  Implementation of the idea requires 
specification of a value for ε.  The need to choose an effect size of 
interest when designing trials already arises in conventional practice, 
where the trial planner must specify the alternative hypothesis to be 
compared with the null.  A possible way to specify ε is to make it equal 
the minimum clinically important difference (MCID) in the average 
treatment effect comparing alternative treatments. 
Medical research has long distinguished between the statistical and 
clinical significance of treatment effects (30).  While the idea of 
clinical significance has been interpreted in various ways, many 
writers call an average treatment effect clinically significant if its 
magnitude is greater than a specified value deemed minimally 
consequential in clinical practice.  The ICH (4) put it this way (p. 
1923): “The treatment difference to be detected may be based on a 
judgment concerning the minimal effect which has clinical relevance 
in the management of patients.” 
Research articles reporting trial findings sometimes pose particular 
values of MCIDs when comparing alternative treatments for specific 
diseases.  For example, in a study comparing drug treatments for 
hypertension, Materson et al. (31) defined the outcome of interest to 
be the fraction of subjects who achieve a specified threshold for blood 
pressure.  They took the MCID to be the fraction 0.15, stating that this 
is (p. 916): “the difference specified in the study design to be clinically 
important” and reported groups of drugs “whose effects do not differ 
from each other by more than 15 percent.” 
 
3.2. Findings with Binary Outcomes, Two Treatments, and Balanced 
Designs 
  
Determination of sample sizes that enable near-optimal treatment is 
simple in settings with binary outcomes (coded 0 and 1 for simplicity), 
two treatments, and a balanced design which assigns the same number 
of subjects to each treatment group.  Table 1 provides exact 
computations of the minimum sample size that enables ε-optimality 
when a clinician uses one of three different treatment rules, for various 
values of ε. 
The first column shows the minimum sample size (per treatment 
arm) that yields ε-optimality when a clinician uses the empirical 
success (ES) rule to make a treatment decision.  The ES rule chooses 
the treatment with the better average outcome in the trial.  The rule 
assigns half the population to each treatment if there is a tie.  It is 
known that the ES rule minimizes maximum regret rule in settings with 
binary outcomes, two treatments, and balanced designs (25). 
The second and third columns display the minimum sample sizes 
that yield ε-optimality of rules based on one-sided 5% and 1% 
hypothesis tests. There is no consensus on what hypothesis test should 
be used to compare two proportions.  We report results based on the 
widely used one-sided two-sample z-test, which is based on an 
asymptotic normal approximation (32). 
The findings are remarkable.  A sample as small as 2 observations 
per treatment arm makes the ES rule ε-optimal when ε = 0.1 and a 
sample of size 145 suffices when ε = 0.01.  The minimum sample sizes 
required for ε-optimality of the test rules are orders of magnitude 
larger.  If the z-test of size 0.05 is used, a sample of size 33 is required 
when ε = 0.1 and 3488 when ε = 0.01.  The sample sizes have to be 
more than double these values if the z-test of size 0.01 is used.   
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between error probabilities and 
regret incurred by the ES rule and the 5% z-test rule for a sample size 
of 145 per arm, the minimum sample size yielding ε-optimality when 
ε = 0.01. The top panels show how the probability of error varies with 
the effect size for all possible distributions of treatment response with 
effect sizes in the range [-0.5, 0.5]. The bottom panels display the 
regret (probability of error times the effect size) of the same treatment 
rules. Maximum regret occurs at intermediate effect sizes. For small 
effect sizes, regret is small because choosing the wrong treatment is 
not clinically significant. Regret is also small for large effect sizes, 
because the probability of error eventually starts declining rapidly with 
the effect size. Traditional power calculations are not informative 
about the maximum regret of a test-based rule. Two red vertical lines 
mark effect sizes at which the z-test has at least 80% and 90% power. 
Neither corresponds to the effect size where regret is maximal.  
 
3.3. Findings with Bounded Outcomes and Multiple Treatments 
 
In principle, the existence of ε-optimal treatment rules under any 
design can be determined by computing the maximum regret of the 
minimax-regret rule.  In practice, determination of the minimax-regret 
rule and its maximum regret may be burdensome.  To date, exact 
minimax-regret decision rules have been derived only for the case of 
two treatments with equal or nearly-equal sample sizes (24-
26).  Hence, it is useful to have simple sufficient conditions that ensure 
existence of ε-optimal rules more generally.  The conditions we derive 
below hold in all settings where outcomes are bounded.  Our findings 
apply to situations in which there are multiple treatments, not just two.  
They also apply when trials stratify patients into groups with different 
observable covariates, such as demographic attributes and risk factors. 
 To show that a specified trial design enables ε-optimal treatment 
rules, it suffices to consider a particular rule and to show that this rule 
is ε-optimal when used with this design.  We focus on empirical 
success rules for both practical and analytical reasons.  Choosing a 
treatment with the highest reported mean outcome is a simple and 
plausible way in which a clinician may use the results of an RCT.  Two 
analytical reasons further motivate interest in ES rules when outcomes 
are bounded.  First, these rules either exactly or approximately 
minimize maximum regret in various settings with two treatments 
when sample size is moderate (25, 26) and asymptotically (23).  
Second, large deviations inequalities derived in (33) allow us to obtain 
informative and easily computable upper bounds on the maximum 
regret of ES rules applied with any number of treatments.  These upper 
bounds on maximum regret immediately yield sample sizes that ensure 
an ES rule is ε-optimal. 
 Propositions 1 and 2  (see the Supporting Information) present two 
alternative upper bounds on the maximum regret of an ES rule. 
Proposition 1 extends finding of Manski (19) from two to multiple 
treatments while Proposition 2 derives a new large-deviations bound 
for multiple treatments.  When the design is balanced, these bounds are 
 
(1) (2e) –½M(K – 1)n–½,  
 
(2) M (ln K)½n–½, 
 
where n is the sample size per arm, K is the number of treatment arms, 
and M is the width of the range of possible outcomes.  Proposition 3 
(see the Supporting Information) shows that the bounds on maximum 
regret derived in Propositions 1 and 2 are minimized by balanced 
designs. Section 3.4 extends these findings to settings where patients 
have observable covariates. 
 Propositions 1 and 2 imply sufficient conditions on sample sizes 
for ε-optimality of ES rules. Proposition 1 implies that an ES rule is ε-
optimal if the sample size per treatment arm is at least 
 
(3) n ≥ (2e)−1(K − 1)2(M/ε)2. 
 
Proposition 2 implies that an ES rule is ε-optimal if the sample size per 
treatment arm is at least 
 
(4) n ≥ ln K (M/ε)2. 
 
We find that when the design is balanced, Proposition 1 provides a 
tighter bound than Proposition 2 for two or three treatments.  
Proposition 2 gives a tighter bound for four or more treatments.   
To illustrate the findings, consider the Materson et al. (31) study 
of treatment for hypertension described in the Introduction.  The 
outcome is binary with the range of possible outcomes M = 1.  The 
study compared seven drug treatments and specified 0.15 as the MCID.  
We cannot know how the authors of the study, who reported results of 
traditional hypothesis tests, would have specified ε had they sought to 
achieve ε-optimality.  If they were to set ε = 0.15, application of bound 
(4) shows that an ES rule is ε-optimal if the number of subjects per 
treatment arm is at least (ln 7)·(0.15)−2 = 86.5.  The actual study has an 
approximately balanced design, with between 178 and 188 subjects in 
each treatment arm. Application of bound (2) shows that a study with 
at least 178 subjects per arm is ε-optimal for ε = (ln 7)½(178)–½ = 0.105. 
It is important to bear in mind that Propositions 1 and 2 only imply 
simple sufficient conditions on sample sizes for ε-optimality of ES 
rules, not necessary ones.  These sufficient conditions use only the 
weak assumption that outcomes are bounded and they rely on 
Hoeffding large-deviations inequalities for bounded outcomes.  In the 
special case of Section 3.1---with binary outcomes, two treatments, 
and a balanced design--the sufficient sample sizes provided by 
Proposition 1 are roughly ten times the size of the exact minimum 
sample sizes, depending on the value of ε.  This strongly suggests that 
it is worthwhile to compute exact minimum sample sizes whenever it 
is tractable to do so. 
 
3.4. Trials Stratified by Observed Covariates 
 
Clinical trials often stratify participants by observable covariates, such 
as demographic attributes and risk factors, and report trial results 
separately for each group. We consider ε-optimality of the ES rule 
which assigns individuals with covariates ξ to the treatment which 
yielded the highest average outcome among trial participants with 
covariates ξ. 
There are at least two reasonable ways that a planner may wish to 
evaluate ε-optimality in this setting.  First, he may want to achieve ε-
optimality within each covariate group.  This interpretation requires no 
new analysis.  The planner should simply define each covariate group 
to be a separate population of interest and then apply the analysis of 
Sections 3.2–3.3 to each group. The design that achieves group-
specific ε-optimality with minimum total sample size equalizes sample 
sizes across groups. 
 Alternatively, the planner may want to achieve ε-optimality within 
the overall population, without requiring that it be achieved within 
each covariate group. Bounds (1) and (2) extend to the setting with 
covariates. With a balanced design assigning nξ individuals from 
covariate group ξ to each treatment, the maximum regret of an ES rule 
is bounded above by 
 
(5)  (2e)–½ M(K − 1) ∑ξ Î X P(x = ξ)(nξ)–½, 
 
(6)  M (ln K)½ ∑ξ Î X P(x = ξ)(nξ)–½. 
 
 The design that minimizes bound (5) or (6) for a given total sample 
size generally neither equalizes sample sizes across groups, nor makes 
them proportional to the covariate distribution P(x = ξ).  Instead, the 
relative sample sizes for any pair (ξ, ξ') of covariate values have the 
approximate ratio 
 
(7)  nξ/nξ'  =  [P(x = ξ)/P(x = ξ')]⅔. 
 
Such trial designs make the covariate-specific sample size increase 
with the prevalence of the covariate group in the population, but less 
than proportionately. Covariate-specific maximum regret 
commensurately decreases with the prevalence of the covariate group. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Choosing sample sizes in clinical trials to enable near-optimal 
treatment rules would align trial design directly with the objective of 
informing treatment choice.  In contrast, the conventional practice of 
choosing sample size to achieve specified statistical power in 
hypothesis testing is only loosely related to treatment choice.  Our 
work adds to the growing concern of scientists that hypothesis testing 
provides an unsuitable methodology for collection and analysis of 
sample data.  
We share with Bayesian statisticians who have written on trial 
design the objective of informing treatment choice.  We differ in our 
application of the frequentist statistical decision theory developed by 
Wald, which does not require that one place a subjective probability 
distribution on treatment response.  We use the concept of ε-optimality, 
which is equivalent to having maximum regret no larger than ε. 
There are numerous potentially fruitful directions for further 
research of the type initiated here.  One is analysis of other types of 
trials.  We have focused on trials that draw subjects at random within 
groups of predetermined size stratified by covariates and treatments.  
With further work, the ideas developed here should be applicable to 
trials where the numbers of subjects who have particular covariates and 
receive specific treatment are ex ante random rather than 
predetermined.   
Our analysis assumed no prior knowledge restricting the variation 
of response across treatments and covariates.  This assumption, which 
has been traditional in frequentist study of clinical trials, is 
advantageous in the sense that it yields generally applicable findings.  
Nevertheless, it is unduly conservative in circumstances where some 
credible knowledge of treatment response is available.  One may, for 
example, think it credible to maintain some assumptions on the degree 
to which treatment response may vary across treatments or covariate 
groups.  When such assumptions are warranted, it may be valuable to 
impose them. 
We mentioned at the outset that medical conventions for choosing 
sample size pertain to classical trials possessing perfect validity.  
However, practical trials usually have only partial validity.  For 
example, the experimental sample may be representative only of a part 
of the target treatment population, because experimental subjects 
typically are persons who meet specified criteria and who consent to 
participate in the trial.  Due to this and other reasons, experimental data 
may only partially identify treatment response in the target treatment 
population.  The concept of ε-optimality extends to such situations. 
Finally, we remark that our analysis followed the longstanding 
practice in medical research of evaluating trial designs by their 
informativeness about treatment response, without consideration of the 
cost of conducting trials.  The concept of ε-optimality can be extended 
to recognize trial cost as a determinant of welfare. 
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Table 1: Minimum Sample Sizes per Treatment Enabling ε-Optimal Treatment Choice: Binary Outcomes, Two Treatments, Balanced Designs 
 
 ε ES Rule One-Sided 
5% z-Test 
One-Sided 
1% z-Test 
0.01 145 3488 7963 
0.03 17 382 879 
0.05 6 138 310 
0.10 2 33 79 
0.15 1 16 35 
 
SUFFICIENT TRIAL SIZE TO INFORM CLINICAL PRACTICE; NOT TO ACHIEVE STATISTICAL 
POWER 
 
SUPPORTING INFORMATION  
 
 
S1. Principles for Evaluation of Trial Designs and Treatment Rules 
 
S1.1. The Decision Problem 
 
The setup is as in (19, 22).  A planner must assign one of K treatments to each member of a treatment 
population, denoted J.  Let T denote a finite set of feasible treatments.  Each j Î J has a response function uj(×): T 
® U mapping treatments t Î T into individual welfare outcomes uj(t) Î R. Treatment is individualistic; that is, a 
person's outcome may depend on the treatment he is assigned but not on the treatments assigned to others.  The 
population is a probability space (J, Ω, P), and the probability distribution P[u(×)] of the random function u(×): T 
® R describes treatment response across the population.  The population is “large;” formally J is uncountable 
and P(j) = 0, j Î J. 
Let person j have observable covariates xj taking a value in a covariate space X; thus, x: J ® X is the 
random variable mapping persons into their covariates.  We suppose that X is finite with P(x = ξ) > 0,  " ξ Î X.  
We also suppose that the covariate distribution P(x) is known. The planner can systematically differentiate persons 
with different observed covariates, but he cannot distinguish among persons with the same observed covariates.   
A statistical treatment rule maps sample data into a treatment allocation.  Let Q denote the sampling 
distribution generating the available data and let Ψ denote the sample space; that is, Ψ is the set of data samples 
that may be drawn under Q. A feasible treatment rule is a function that assigns all persons with the same observed 
covariates to one treatment or, more generally, a function that randomly allocates such persons across the different 
treatments.  Let Δ now denote the space of functions that map T ´ X ´ Ψ into the unit interval and that satisfy the 
adding-up conditions: δ Î Δ  Þ   ∑ t Î T δ(t, ξ, ψ) = 1,  " (ξ, ψ)  Î X ´ Ψ.  Then each function δ Î Δ defines a 
statistical treatment rule.   
The planner wants to maximize population welfare, which adds welfare outcomes across persons.  Given 
data ψ, the population welfare that would be realized if the planner were to choose rule δ is 
 
(S1)     U(δ, P, ψ)   º     ∑   P(x = ξ)   ∑  δ(t, ξ, ψ)×E[u(t)|x = ξ]  =   ∑  P(x = ξ)   ∑  δ(t, ξ, ψ)×µtξ , 
                                                    ξ Î X               t Î T                                                         ξ Î X               t Î T 
 
where µtξ º E[u(t)|x = ξ] is the mean outcome of treatment t among individuals with covariates ξ. Inspection of 
(S1) shows that, whatever value ψ may take, it is optimal to set δ(t, ξ, ψ) = 0 if µtξ < max t' Î T µt'ξ. 
The problem of interest is treatment choice when one does not have enough knowledge of P[u(·)|x] to 
determine the optimal treatment that maximizes µtξ for each ξ Î X. 
 
S1.2. Evaluating Treatment Rules by their State-Dependent Welfare Distributions 
 
The starting point for development of implementable criteria for treatment choice under uncertainty is 
specification of a state space, say S.  Thus, let {(Ps, Qs), s Î S} be the set of (P, Q) pairs that the planner deems 
possible.   
Considered as a function of ψ, U(δ, Ps, ψ) is a random variable with state-dependent sampling distribution 
Qs[U(δ, Ps, ψ)].  Following Wald's view of statistical decision functions as procedures, we use the vector {Qs[U(δ, 
Ps, ψ)], s Î S} of state-dependent welfare distributions to evaluate rule δ.  In principle this vector is computable, 
whatever the state space and sampling process may be.  Hence, in principle, a planner can compare the vectors of 
state-dependent welfare distributions yielded by different STRs and base treatment choice on this comparison. 
How might a planner compare the state-dependent welfare distributions yielded by different STRs?  The 
planner wants to maximize welfare, so it seems self-evident that he should weakly prefer rule δ to an alternative 
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rule δ¢ if, in every s Î S, Qs[U(δ, Ps, ψ)] equals or stochastically dominates Qs[U(δ¢, Ps, ψ)].  It is less obvious 
how one should compare rules whose state-dependent welfare distributions are not uniformly ordered in this 
manner, as is typically the case. 
Wald evaluated statistical decision functions by their mean performance across realizations of the 
sampling process and this has become the standard practice in the subsequent literature. The expected welfare 
yielded by rule δ in state s, denoted W(δ, Ps, Qs), is 
 
(S2)     W(δ, Ps, Qs)  º  òΨ    ∑   P(x = ξ)  ∑  δ(t, ξ, ψ)×µstξ dQs(ψ)  =   ∑   P(x = ξ)   ∑ Es[δ(t, ξ, ψ)]×µstξ. 
                                                            ξ Î X                     t Î T                                                     ξ Î X                      t Î T 
 
Here Es[δ(t, ξ, ψ)]  º  òΨ δ(t, ξ, ψ)dQs(ψ) is the expected (across potential samples) fraction of persons with 
covariates ξ who are assigned to treatment t. We add subscript s to µstξ because mean treatment response varies 
across s Î S. 
 
 
S1.3. Optimality and ε-Optimality of Treatment Rules 
 
 A planner must confront the fact that the true state of nature is unknown. The maximum welfare achievable 
in each state s is 
 
(S3)     U*(Ps)   º      ∑   P(x = ξ)×max µstξ. 
                                            ξ Î X                      t Î T 
 
 We define rule δ to be mean optimal if W(δ, Ps, Qs) = U*(Ps) for all s Î S.  Mean optimality is desirable, but it 
is too strong to be achievable in general.  The concept of mean ε-optimality relaxes mean optimality, yielding a 
property that may be achievable in practice. 
We define rule δ to be mean ε-optimal for a specified ε > 0 if W(δ, Ps, Qs) ≥  U*(Ps) − ε for all s Î S. 
Section S2 shows that mean ε-optimal treatment rules exist when treatment outcomes are bounded and classical 
trials have sufficient finite size, whatever the state space may be.  This finding makes ε-optimality a practical 
criterion for trial design. 
Stating that an STR is ε-optimal is equivalent to stating that it has maximum regret no larger than ε.  By 
definition, the regret of rule δ in state s is U*(Ps) − W(δ, Ps, Qs).  The maximum regret of δ across all states is 
max s Î S [U*(Ps) − W(δ, Ps, Qs)].  Thus, maximum regret is less than or equal to ε if and only if U*(Ps) − W(δ, Ps, Qs) 
≤ ε for all s Î S.  It follows that mean ε-optimal STRs exist with a specified design if and only if the maximum 
regret of the minimax-regret rule is less than or equal to ε. 
 
 
S2. Randomized Trials with Sample Sizes Enabling ε-Optimal Treatment 
 
We now investigate the existence of ε-optimal treatment rules when the data are generated by classical 
randomized trials.  We specifically consider trials that draw subjects at random within groups stratified by 
covariates and treatments.  Thus, for (t, ξ) Î T ´ X, the experimenter draws ntξ subjects at random from the sub-
population with covariates ξ and assigns them to treatment t.  The set nTX º [ntξ, (t, ξ) Î T ´ X] of stratum sample 
sizes defines the design.  Let N(t, ξ) be the realized sample of subjects with covariates ξ who are assigned to 
treatment t.  The data are the sample outcomes ψ = [uj, j Î N(t, ξ); (t, ξ) Î T ´ X].  We suppose throughout that 
the state space S contains all distributions of treatment response.  Thus, the planner has no prior knowledge 
restricting the variation of response across treatments and covariates. 
3 
 
In principle, the existence of ε-optimal STRs under any design can be determined by computing the 
maximum regret of the minimax-regret (MMR) rule.  As noted earlier, ε-optimal rules exist if and only if the 
MMR rule has maximum regret less than or equal to ε.  In practice, determination of the MMR rule and 
computation of its maximum regret may be burdensome.    Hence, it is useful to have simple sufficient conditions 
that ensure existence of ε-optimal rules.  This section provides such conditions in settings where outcomes are 
bounded. 
 
S2.1. Sufficient Conditions for ε-Optimality of Empirical Success Rules 
 
 To show that a specified trial design enables ε-optimal STRs, it suffices to consider a particular STR and to 
show that this rule is ε-optimal when used with this design.  We focus on empirical success (ES) rules, which use 
the empirical distribution of the sample data to estimate the population distribution of treatment response.  
Formally, let mtξ(ψ) be the average outcome in treatment-covariate sub-sample N(t, ξ); that is, mtξ(ψ) º 
(1/ntξ)∑ j Î N(t, ξ) uj.  An ES rule δ assigns all persons with covariates ξ to treatments that maximize mtξ(ψ) over T.  
Thus, δ(t, ξ, ψ) = 0 if mtξ(ψ) < max t'ÎT mt'ξ(ψ). 
 The case of two treatments has been studied previously in Manski (19), who exploited the large deviations 
result of Hoeffding (33) to derive an upper bound on the maximum regret of a class of ES rules that condition 
treatment on alternative subsets of the observable covariates of population members.  The bound takes a 
particularly simple form when one conditions on all observable covariates and the state space includes all 
distributions of treatment response. 
Let outcomes lie in the bounded range [ul, uh], whose width we denote by M º uh − ul.  Label the two 
treatments t = a and t = b, and let S index all distributions of treatment response.  Manski (19) showed in eq. 23 
that the maximum regret of an ES rule δ is bounded from above as follows: 
 
(S4) max sÎS [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤  ½e –½ M ∑ ξÎX P(x = ξ)(naξ–1 + nbξ–1)½. 
 
Hence, an ES rule is ε-optimal if the trial sample sizes satisfy the inequality 
 
(S5) ½e –½ M ∑ ξÎX P(x = ξ)(naξ–1 + nbξ–1)½  ≤  ε. 
 
When the design is balanced, with ntξ = n for all (t, ξ), inequality (S5) reduces to (2e)–½ Mn–½ ≤ ε.  Hence, an ES 
rule with a balanced design is ε-optimal if n ≥ (2e)–1(M/ε)2. 
 In what follows we present new findings that hold with any finite number K of treatments.  Section S2.2 
considers trial design when members of the population have no observable covariates.  Section S2.3 extends the 
analysis to settings with covariates. 
 
S2.2. Large Deviation Bounds on Maximum Regret with Multiple Treatments 
 
 Propositions 1 and 2 present two alternative upper bounds on the maximum regret of an ES rule. Proposition 
1 extends inequality (S4) to multiple treatments while Proposition 2 derives a different type of bound.  We find 
that when the design is balanced, with nt = n for all t, Proposition 1 provides a tighter bound than Proposition 2 
when there are two or three treatments.  Proposition 2 gives a tighter bound when there are four or more 
treatments.  Proposition 3 shows that, for any given total sample size that is an integer multiple of K, the bounds 
on maximum regret derived in Propositions 1 and 2 are minimized by balanced designs. 
In all propositions, a design is a vector of sample sizes (nt, t Î T) and t* Î argmin t Î T nt denotes a treatment 
with the smallest sample size.  In the proofs we let t(s) designate any one of the optimal treatments in state s; that 
is, µst(s) ≥ µst for all t Î T. 
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Proposition 1: The maximum regret of an empirical success rule δ is bounded above as follows: 
 
(S6) max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤  ½e–½ M ∑ t ≠ t* (nt–1 + nt*–1)½. 
 
When the design is balanced, with nt = n for all t, the bound is (2e)–½ M (K − 1)n–½.    o 
 
Proof: Given that δ is an empirical success rule, δ(t, ψ) ≤ 1[mt ≥ mt'] for all (t, t') in T and all ψ Î Ψ.  Therefore, 
Es[δ(t, ψ)] ≤ Ps(mt ≥ mt') in each state s.  Hence, Es[δ(t, ψ)] ≤ Ps(mt ≥ mt(s)).  The best achievable welfare in state s 
is U*(Ps) = µst(s).  Hence, the regret of δ in state s is 
 
 U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)  =  µst(s) − ∑ t Î T Es[δ(t, ψ)]µst  =  ∑ t ≠ t(s) Es[δ(t, ψ)](µst(s) – µst)  ≤ 
 
                                                                                        ≤  ∑ t ≠ t(s) (µst(s) – µst)·Ps(mt ≥ mt(s)). 
 
Adaptation of the argument used by Manski (19) to obtain inequality (S4) from Hoeffding's Theorem 2 (33) shows 
that 
 
 (µst(s) – µst)·P(mt ≥ mt(s))  ≤   ½e–½ M (nt–1 + nt(s)–1)½. 
 
It follows that 
 
 U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)  ≤  ½e–½ M ∑ t ≠ t(s) (nt–1 + nt(s)–1)½. 
 
Hence, maximum regret is bounded above as follows: 
 
             max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤  ½e–½ M max sÎS ∑ t ≠ t(s) (nt–1 + nt(s)–1)½. 
 
Finally, the summation ∑ t ≠ t(s) (nt–1 + nt(s)–1)½ is maximized in a state s such that t(s) = t*, where t* is a treatment 
with the smallest sample size.  This holds because nt** ≥ nt* for any t** ≠ t*.  Hence, 
 
           ∑ t ≠ t* (nt–1 + nt*–1)½  –  ∑ t ≠ t** (nt–1 + nt**–1)½  =  ∑ t ≠ t*, t** [(nt–1 + nt*–1)½  – (nt–1 + nt**–1)½]  ≥  0. 
 
Thus, (S6) holds. 
                                                                                                                                                 Q. E. D. 
 
 
Proposition 2: The maximum regret of an empirical success rule δ is bounded above by 
 
                                                                                    ln{1 +  ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]}  
(S7) max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤   N–½ M   min  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– , 
                                                                             d > 0                               d 
 
where N º ∑ t Î T nt is total sample size and pt º nt/N.  When the design is balanced, with nt = n for all t, 
(S7) implies the bound 
 
(S8) max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤ M (ln K)½ n–½.           o 
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Proof: The proof of (S7) is in four parts.  Result (S8) is then proved in Part V. 
 
I: Fix state s and consider a treatment t(s) that is optimal in this state.  Fix the sample data ψ.  Let 
 
 Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)  º  [mt(ψ) – mt(s)(ψ)] – (µst – µst(s)) 
 
denote the amount by which mt(ψ) – mt(s)(ψ) overestimates µst – µst(s). Note that Ds[t(s),t(s)](ψ) = 0. We first show 
that the welfare loss U*(Ps) – U(δ, Ps, ψ) is bounded above by 
 
 U*(Ps) – U(δ, Ps, ψ)  ≤  max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ). 
 
To prove this inequality, let t be any treatment and observe that a necessary condition for δ(t, ψ) > 0 is that mt(ψ) 
≥ mt(s)(ψ).  For any t such that δ(t, ψ) > 0, 
 
 µst(s) – µst  ≤  [mt(ψ) – mt(s)(ψ)] – [µst – µst(s)]  =  Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)  ≤  max t' Î T Ds[t', t(s)](ψ). 
 
Given that δ(t, ψ) ≥ 0 for all t and that ∑ t Î T δ(t, ψ) = 1, it follows that 
 
  U*(Ps) – U(δ, Ps, ψ)  =  ∑ t: δ(t, ψ) > 0 δ(t, ψ)(µst(s) – µst)  ≤  max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ). 
 
II: Each variable Ds[t, t(s)](ψ) is a sum of independent mean zero variables 
 
 Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)  =  [mt(ψ) – µst] – [mt(s)(ψ) – µst(s)]  =  ∑ j  Î N(t) (uj – µst)/nt – ∑ j  Î N[t(s)] (uj – µst(s))/nt(s). 
 
Inequality (4.16) of Hoeffding (33) applies to each element of both sums on the right-hand side.  This inequality 
shows that, for any c > 0, 
 
 Es{exp{c[(u – µst)/nt)]}  ≤  exp[c2nt–2 M2/8] 
 
 for each element of the first sum and 
 
  Es{exp{c[(u – µst(s))/nt(s))]}  ≤  exp[c2nt(s)–2 M2/8] 
 
for each element of the second sum. The statistical independence of these elements implies that 
 
 Es{exp[c·Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]}  ≤  exp[c2(nt–1 + nt(s)–1) M2/8]. 
 
III: The conclusion to Part I implies that the regret of δ in state s is bounded above as follows: 
 
          U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)  ≤  Es[max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]. 
 
We use the conclusion to Part II and a proof similar to Lemma 1.3 of Lugosi (34) to obtain an upper bound on 
Es[max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)].  For any c > 0, by Jensen's inequality, 
 
exp{c×Es[max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]}  ≤  Es{exp[c×max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]}  = 
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=  Es{max t Î T exp{c×Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]}  ≤  Es{∑ t Î T exp[c×Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]}  = 
 
=  1 +  ∑ t ≠ t(s) Es{exp[c×Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]}  ≤ 
 
≤  1 +  ∑ t ≠ t(s) exp[c2(nt–1 + nt(s)–1)M2/8], 
 
where the last inequality follows from the conclusion to Part II.  Taking the logarithm of both sides and dividing 
by c yields 
 
                                                   ln {1 +  ∑ t ≠ t(s) exp[c2(nt–1 + nt(s)–1) M2/8]} 
 Es[max t Î T Ds[t, t(s)](ψ)]    ≤  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––  = 
                                                                                   c 
  
                        ln {1 + ∑ t ≠ t(s) exp[d2(pt–1 + pt(s)–1)/8]} 
      =  N–½ M  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– , 
                                                                d 
 
here d = N–½Mc. 
 
IV. The conclusion to III holds in every state s.  Hence, the maximum regret of δ is bounded above by 
 
                                                                                   ln {1 + ∑ t ≠ t(s) exp[d2(pt–1 + pt(s)–1)/8]}  
 max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤   N–½ M max  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– . 
                                                                      s Î S                                 d 
 
The summation ∑ t ≠ t(s) exp[d2(pt–1 + pt(s)–1)/8] is maximized in a state s such that t(s) = t*, where t* is a treatment 
with the smallest sample size.  This holds because pt** ≥ pt* for any t** ≠ t*.  Hence, 
 
 ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]  −  ∑ t ≠ t** exp[d2(pt–1 + pt**–1)/8]  = 
   =  ∑ t ≠ t*, t**{exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*)–1)/8] − exp[d2(pt–1 + pt**–1)/8] }  ≥  0. 
 
The above shows that 
 
                                                                           ln {1 + ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]}  
 max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤   N–½ M ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– . 
                                                                                             d 
 
Finally, observe that the above inequality holds for all d > 0.  This yields result (S7). 
 
V. If nt = n for all t, then pt = n/N for all t.  It follows that 
 
 1 +  ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]  ≤  K×exp[(n/N)–1d2/4]. 
 
Hence, (S7) implies that 
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                                                                                 ln{K×exp[(n/N)–1d2/4]} 
   max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤   N–½ M  min  –––––––––––––––––––  
                                                                        d > 0                   d 
  
                                                                                      ln[K×exp(h2/4)] 
                                                                  =  n–½ M  min  ––––––––––––– , 
                                                                              h > 0            h 
 
where h = (n/N)−½d.  The minimum is obtained at h = 2(ln K)½.  This implies result (S8). 
                                                                                                                                               Q. E. D. 
 
 
Proposition 3: Consider any positive integer n.  Among all designs with total sample size K·n, 
(a) bound (S6) in Proposition 1 is minimized by a balanced design with nt = n for all t. 
(b) bound (S7) in Proposition 2 is minimized by a balanced design with pt = 1/K for all t.             o 
 
Proof: 
a) Bound (S6) of Proposition 1 established that maximum regret is less than 
 
 ½e–½M ∑ t ≠ t* (nt–1 + nt*–1)½. 
 
For a balanced design, the sum in the bound equals 
 
 ∑ t ≠ t* (n–1 + n–1)½  =  (K – 1)2½n–½. 
 
For any design with ∑ t Î T  nt = K·n, the minimum sample size is nt* ≤ n.  This and the fact that K ≥ 2 imply that 
 
(S9) ∑ t ≠ t* (nt + nt*)  =  K·n + (K – 2)nt*  ≤  2(K – 1)·n. 
 
Applying Jensen's inequality to f(x) = x–1, which is convex for x > 0, yields nt–1 + nt*–1  ≥  4(nt + nt*)–1.  In the 
derivation below, we apply this inequality to the sum in bound (S6), then apply Jensen's inequality to the function 
f(x) = x–½, which is convex for x > 0, and then combine inequality (S9) with the fact that f(x) = x–½ is a decreasing 
function: 
 
 ∑ t ≠ t* (nt–1 + nt*–1)½  ≥  ∑ t ≠ t* [4(nt + nt*)–1]½  =  2 ∑ t ≠ t* (nt + nt*)–½  ≥ 
                                  ≥  2(K – 1)·[(K – 1)–1 ∑ t ≠ t* (nt + nt*)] –½  ≥ 
                                  ≥  2(K – 1)·[(K – 1)–12(K – 1)·n] –½  = (K – 1)2½n–½. 
 
This shows that the bound for any design with total sample size K·n is no smaller than the bound with a balanced 
design. 
 
(b) Bound (S7) of Proposition 2 established that maximum regret is less than  
 
                       ln{1 +  ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]}  
 N–½ M  min  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– . 
             d > 0                             d 
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For a balanced design and any d > 0, the sum in the bound equals 
 
 ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]  =  ∑ t ≠ t* exp{d2[(1/K)–1 + (1/K)–1]/8}  =  (K – 1)exp(d2K/4). 
 
We will show that for any (pt, t Î T) such that ∑ t Î T pt = 1, 
 
 ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]  ≥  (K – 1) exp(d2K/4). 
 
This result, which holds for all d > 0, and the fact that ln(·) is an increasing function show that the bound for any 
design with total sample size K·n is no smaller than the bound with a balanced design. 
 Applying Jensen's inequality to f(x) = x–1, which is convex for x > 0, yields pt–1 + pt*–1  ≥  4(pt + pt*)–1.  Given 
that exp(·) is increasing, it follows that  
 
(S10) ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]  ≥  ∑ t ≠ t* exp[(d2/2)·(pt + pt*)–1]. 
 
Applying Jensen's inequality to the convex function f(x) = exp(x) yields 
 
(S11) ∑ t ≠ t* exp[(d2/2)·(pt + pt*)–1]  ≥  (K – 1) exp{(K – 1)–1 ∑ t ≠ t*[(d2/2)·(pt + pt*)–1]}  = 
 
                                                     =  (K – 1) exp[(d2/2)·(K – 1)–1 ∑ t ≠ t* (pt + pt*)–1]. 
 
Applying Jensen's inequality to f(x) = x–1, which is convex for x > 0, yields 
 
            (K – 1)–1 ∑ t ≠ t* (pt + pt*)–1  ≥  [(K – 1)–1 ∑ t ≠ t* (pt + pt*)]–1  =  {(K – 1)–1[1+ (K – 2)pt*]}–1. 
 
Given that K – 2 ≥ 0 and pt* ≤ 1/K, it follows that 1+ (K – 2)pt* ≤ 2(K – 1)/K.  Given that f(x) = x–1 is a decreasing 
function, it follows that 
 
(S12) (K – 1)–1 ∑ t ≠ t* (pt + pt*)–1  ≥  {(K – 1)–1 [2(K – 1)/K]}–1  =  K/2. 
 
Combining (S10), (S11), and (S12) with the monotonicity of exp(·) yields 
 
 ∑ t ≠ t* exp[d2(pt–1 + pt*–1)/8]  ≥  (K – 1)exp[d2K/4]. 
                                                                                                                                                   Q. E. D. 
 
Table S1 presents the values of bounds (S6), (S7), and (S8) for balanced designs.  The three bounds vary 
identically with Mn–½ but differently with the number of treatments.  Proposition 1 provides a better bound for K 
≤ 3, while Proposition 2 provides a better bound for K ≥ 4.  Bound (S8) of Proposition 2 is simpler to compute 
than bound (S7) and is only marginally larger. 
We have also computed bounds (S6) and (S7) for various unbalanced designs.  We again find that bound 
(S6) is better for K ≤ 3 and bound (S7) is better for K ≥ 4.  These results are not shown in the table. 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply sufficient conditions on sample sizes for ε-optimality of ES rules.  If the upper 
bound on maximum regret with a specified trial design is less than or equal to ε, then ES rules are ε-optimal with 
this design. 
The findings are particularly simple with balanced designs.  Then bound (S6) of Proposition 1 implies that 
an ES rule is ε-optimal if n ≥ (2e)–1(K − 1)2(M/ε)2.  Bound (S8) of Proposition 2 implies that an ES rule is ε-
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optimal if n ≥ ln K·(M/ε)2.  Table S1 gives the threshold sample size for bound (S7) of Proposition 2 for K ≤ 7, 
which is (M/ε)2 times the square of the relevant constant shown in the table.   
 It is important to bear in mind that Propositions 1 and 2 only imply simple sufficient conditions on sample 
sizes for ε-optimality of ES rules, not necessary ones. Proposition 1, for example, could be sharpened for balanced 
designs by replacing Hoeffding's inequality by Theorem 1.2 of Bentkus (35) and further improvements should be 
possible. The Bentkus inequality is expressed in terms of a tail probability of a binomial distribution and the 
resulting regret bound has to be evaluated numerically for each n. For large values of n, the regret bound could 
be up to 23.5% smaller than (S6). 
 In general it is difficult to compute the exact maximum regret of ES rules, hence difficult to determine how 
conservative the propositions are.  An exception occurs when there are two treatments and outcomes are binary.  
Then the maximum regret of various decision rules can be computed numerically without large deviations bounds.   
 
S2.3. ε-Optimality of Empirical Success Rules with Observable Covariates 
 
 The above analysis has assumed that members of the population have no observable covariates that may be 
used to condition treatment choice.  Suppose now that persons have observable covariates taking values in a finite 
set X and that the planner can execute a trial with (treatment, covariate)-specific sample sizes [ntξ, (t, ξ) Î T ´ X].  
We consider the ES rule defined in Section S1.3, which assigns all persons with covariates ξ to treatments that 
maximize mtξ(ψ) over T, mtξ(ψ) being the average outcome in sub-sample N(t, ξ). 
 There are at least two reasonable ways that a planner may wish to evaluate ε-optimality in this setting.  First, 
he may want to achieve ε-optimality within each covariate group.  This interpretation requires no new analysis.  
The planner should simply define each covariate group to be a separate population of interest and then apply the 
analysis of Section S2.2 to each group.  The design that achieves group-specific ε-optimality with minimum total 
sample size equalizes sample sizes across groups. 
 Alternatively, the planner may want to achieve ε-optimality within the overall population, without requiring 
that it be achieved within each covariate group.  This is the interpretation given in Section S1.3, when we defined 
rule δ to be ε-optimal if W(δ, Ps, Qs) ≥  U*(Ps) − ε for all s Î S.  In this case, the design that achieves ε-optimality 
with minimum total sample size does not equalize sample sizes across groups. 
 Propositions 1 and 2 easily extend to provide sample sizes sufficiently large to yield the latter interpretation of 
ε-optimality.  Applying Proposition 1 to each group and aggregating the bounds across groups implies that the 
maximum regret of ES rules is bounded above by 
 
(S6') max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤  ½e–½ M   ∑   P(x = ξ) ∑ t ≠ t*(ξ) (ntξ–1 + nt*(ξ)ξ–1)½, 
                                                              ξ Î X 
 
where t*(ξ) Î argmin t Î T ntξ denotes a treatment with the smallest sample size among individuals with covariate 
value ξ.  When the design is balanced across treatments for each covariate, with ntξ = nξ for all t, the bound is 
 
(S13) (2e)–½ (K − 1) M  ∑   P(x = ξ) nξ–½. 
                                 ξ Î X  
 
The analogous extension of Proposition 2 yields 
 
(S7') max s Î S [U*(Ps) – W(δ, Ps, Qs)]  ≤ 
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                                                  ln{1 +  ∑ t ≠ t*(ξ) exp[d2(ptξ –1 + pt*(ξ)ξ–1)/8]}  
 ≤   M  ∑    P(x = ξ) Nξ–½  min  ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– , 
          ξ Î X                         d > 0                               d 
 
where Nξ º ∑ t Î T ntξ is total sample size for individuals with covariate value ξ and ptξ º ntξ/Nξ.  When the design 
is balanced across treatments for each covariate, Nξ–½ = K–½ nξ–½, ptξ = 1/K for all (t, ξ), and the bound in (S7') 
simplifies to 
 
                       ln{1 +  (K – 1) exp(d2K/4)} 
(S14) K–½  min  ––––––––––––––––––––––––   M  ∑   P(x = ξ)·nξ–½. 
              d > 0                       d                               ξ Î X                          
 
Bounds (S13) and (S14) can easily be evaluated for any candidate treatment-balanced design to verify whether it 
suffices to enable ε-optimal treatment rules.  The constants preceding ∑ ξ Î X P(x = ξ)·nξ–½ in these bounds are 
given in Table S1 for K ≤ 7. 
Given a predetermined maximum total sample size N, minimizing bounds (S13) and (S14) is achieved by 
choosing (nξ, ξ Î X) to minimize ∑ ξ Î X P(x = ξ)·nξ–½ subject to the constraint ∑ ξ Î X nξ ≤  N/K.  Given that the 
objective function is decreasing in each nξ, the constraint binds. The Lagrangian expression of the constrained 
minimization problem is 
 
(S15) L[(nξ, ξ Î X), λ]  º  ∑ ξ Î X P(x = ξ)·nξ–½ + λ(∑ ξ Î X nξ  – N/K). 
 
A simple approximation to the minimization problem results if one treats (nξ, ξ Î X) as continuous variables rather 
than as integer sample sizes. Then the first order conditions for minimization of L(×, ×) yield 
 
(S16) –½P(x = ξ)·nξ–3/2 + λ  =  0,  all ξ Î X. 
 
This implies that nξ = (2λ)–⅔P(x = ξ)⅔.  It follows that, to solve problem (S16), the relative sample sizes for any 
pair (ξ, ξ') of covariate values have the approximate ratio 
 
(S17) nξ/nξ'  =  [P(x = ξ)/P(x = ξ')]⅔. 
 
For the case when the covariate takes two values, a similar result is obtained by Schlag (24). 
A planner who uses (S17) to choose the trial design makes the covariate-specific sample size increase 
with the prevalence of the covariate group in the population, albeit less than proportionately.  Covariate-specific 
maximum regret commensurately decreases with the prevalence of the covariate group. 
 
Table S1: Bounds in Propositions 1 and 2 for Balanced Designs with n Subjects per Treatment 
K  = 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Bound (S6) 0.4289 0.8578 1.2866 1.7155 2.1444 2.5733 · Mn–½ 
Bound (S7) 0.6539 0.9279 1.0892 1.1999 1.2827 1.3481 · Mn–½ 
Bound (S8) 0.8326 1.0481 1.1774 1.2686 1.3386 1.3950 · Mn–½ 
 
